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ARGUMENT
I

The State Failed To Dispute The Facts Supporting The
Defendants' Motion To Dismiss In The Lower Court
The State does not dispute the Defendants' "Statement of Relevant

Facts" on appeal, but instead sets up its own statement of facts. Compare,
Aplnt. Br. 12-17 and Aplee. Br. 5-7. As in the lower court, the State
attempts to sever the use of peyote by members of the Defendant Oklevueha
Earthwalks Native American Church of Utah and its spiritual leaders, the
Defendants James and Linda Mooney,fromits religious context and to cast
doubt on the propriety of the Defendants' religious beliefs and practices. Id.
Although the State implies that the Defendant James Mooney is not
of Native American Indian descent, Aplee. Br. 7, n.5, the State presented no
evidence in the lower court to counter the Defendant Mooney's sworn
affidavit regarding his Native American ancestry, his membership in the
non-federally recognized Seminole Tribe, his long participation as a member
and spiritual leader in the Native American Church, or his legal authori-

1 The worship of peyote as a deity and sacrament by Native American Church
members is, by its very nature and history, a religious exercise. Thus, no inquiry as
to the depth or sincerity of belief is required. See, Snyder v. Murray City Corp..
2003 UT 13, U24, quoting Society of Separationists. supra, at 192 ("prayerful
address of a deity, by its very nature, is a religious exercise... No inquiry as to the
depth or sincerity of belief is required.")

zation to obtain peyote for the Defendant Church. See, 1fl|4-6, Aplnl. Br. 14.
Likewise, in the lower court, the State did not contest Defendant Linda
Mooney's sworn affidavit regarding her history of participation and
leadership in the Native American Church. See,fflj1,5, Aplnt. Br. 13.
The State represents that the facts in its "Statement of Facts" are
"from the preliminary hearing testimony and the trial court's ruling on
defendant's motion to dismiss", Aplee. Br. 5, n. 3, as if such "facts" were
presented in opposition to the Defendants' Motion To Dismiss in the lower
court. However, this portrayal is unfounded. The State did not dispute any of
the seventeen paragraphs of undisputed facts supporting the Defendants'
Motion To Dismiss in the lower court. Aplnt. Br. 12, n.4. 2 Thus, the State
does not cite to its memorandum in opposition to Defendants' Motion To

2 The State represents that it "claims" to have evidence that some members of the
Defendant Native American Church were given "maintenance doses" of peyote
which they carried away from Church ceremonies, as support for its spurious claim
that Church members were engaging in the non-religious use of peyote. Aplee. Br. 6,
n.4. However, the carrying of peyote on the person of a Native American Church
member is part of Native American Church religious belief and practice. The only
court to consider this issue held that the practice was protected by the First
Amendment and dismissed the criminal prosecution against the defendant
predicated on such practice. See, Whitehorn v. State. 1977 OK CR 65,561 P.2d 539,
547-548 (1977).

Dismiss in the lower court. Aplee. Br. 5-7.
On appeal, the State concedes that the multiple racketeering and
felony drug charges against the Defendants, arise from their conduct f,in
acquiring, disseminating, and using peyote in conjunction with the operation
of the (Defendant) Church", Aplee. Br. 4, and that the Defendant Church has
"NAC status." Aplee. Br. n.5, at 7-8. The State also does not dispute that the
Defendant Native American Church is open to all individuals, regardless of
their race, or political status as a member, or non-member, of a federally
recognized tribe. See, TJ3, Aplnt. Br. 13-14.
II

The Utah Controlled Substances Act Incorporates The Federal
Exemption From Criminal Prosecution For The Religious Use
Of Peyote By Members Of the Native American Church
Without Regard To Their Race Or Membership In A Federally
Recognized Tribe

3 In its memorandum in opposition to the Defendants9 Motion To Dismiss in the
lower court, Case No. 36, R. 171-175, the State alleged that the Defendants James
and Linda Mooney, "in their capacities as principals of OENAC repeatedly met
with groups averaging about 10 to 15 people and distributed peyote, a Schedule One
controlled substance to those groups of people/' See, Case No. 36, R. 235-236. The
Defendants directly contested this allegation in their Reply Memorandum, with
sworn affidavits of the Defendants James and Linda Mooney, stating they had
provided peyote to members of the Oklevueha Earthwalks Native American Church
in bona fide Church ceremonies in their capacities as spiritual leaders of the
Church, Case No. 36, R. 254-255,237-246. Thus, the State's arguments, and the
lower court's findings, that: "Defendants, in support of their memorandum, recite
no facts", and that "Defendants failed to take issue with the facts recited in the
State's written response," Ruling, Aplnt. Br., Add. 1 at 2, are contrary to the
evidence of record in the lower court, and do not support the State's belated, nonevidentiary attack on the credibility of the facts alleged by Defendants in support of
their motion to dismiss in the lower court. Aplee. Br. 7, n. 5.
-*

The State provides no evidence, statutory analysis, or legal authority,
disputing the Defendants' assertion that the federal exemption to Schedule I
of the Federal Controlled Substances Act, 21 C.F.R. §1307.31, which
provides an exemption from criminal prosecution for the nondrug, religious
use of peyote by members of the Native American Church in bona fide
religious ceremonies (hereinafter "the federal exemption"), is incorporated
by reference in §5 8-37-4(2)(a)(iii) of the Utah Controlled Substances Act.
Compare, Argument, Point I, Aplnt. Br. 23-24, 27-29, and Argument, Point
I, Aplee. Br. 8, 11-13. Additionally, the State fails to counter the
Defendants' evidence that 28 States have incorporated the federal exemption
for the religious use of peyote by "members of the Native American Church"
in their controlled substances laws, either expressly or in substance.
Compare, Aplnt. Br. 27-29 and Aplee. Br. 11-13.
Finally, the State's argument that the federal exemption is an
administrative regulation that is "not binding on state courts", Aplee. Br. 1819, is inapplicable where, as here, Utah and 27 other States have freely
chosen to adopt the federal exemption expressly, or in substance, in their
Controlled Substances Acts. See, Aplnt. Br. 23-24, 27-29.
Based upon the foregoing, the Court should hold that the federal
exemption contained in 21 C.F.R. §1307.31 is incorporated in the Utah

Controlled Substances Act (hereinafter "the Utah Statutory Exemption"),
and that members of the Defendant Oklevueha Earthwalks Native American
Church of Utah, and its spiritual leaders, the Defendants James and Linda
Mooney, are exempt from criminal prosecution under the Act, for their
nondrug, religious use of peyote in bona fide Church ceremonies. Aplnt.
Br. 23-24; 27-29.
Ill

The State's Interpretation Of The Utah Statutory Exemption
Ts Contrary To Utah Rules of Statutory Construction
The State does not dispute that under Utah rules of statutory

construction, "It is a 'fundamental rule' that constitutional questions should
not be reached if the merits of the case can be determined on other than
constitutional grounds", and that in interpreting a statute, "where the
language is plain and unambiguous, this Court will not look beyond the
same to divine legislative intent." Aplnt. Br. 26-27, quoting, State In Interest
ofA.B.,93b I'.Al 1091, 1097 (Utah App. 199/) (reviewing Utah cases).
The State does not challenge Defendants' assertion that the language
of 21 C.F.R. §1307.31 is incorporated in the Utah Statutory Exemption,
providing an exemption from criminal prosecution for the non-drug,
religious use of peyote by "members of the Native American Church", "is
clear and unambiguous on its face." Compare, Aplnt. Br. 25-31 and Aplee.
Br. 8, 12. 1 hus, under Utah rules of statutory construction, there is no
5

reason to look beyond the plain wording of the federal exemption to discern
its meaning in interpreting the Utah Statutory Exemption. Aplnt. Br. 25-31.
The State also fails to answer Defendants' contention that the fact that
the Utah Legislature determined to provide an exemption from criminal
prosecution for the nondrug, religious use of peyote by Native American
Church members, when more than 20 states do not, and that the Utah
Legislature opted to incorporate the federal exemption in 21 C.F.R.
§1307.31, rather than the more restrictive exemptions adopted by some
States,4 indicates that the Utah Legislature desired a broad exemption for
"members of the Native American Church" that would be consistent with the
expansive guarantees offreedomof religious belief and practice established
in the Utah Constitution, to ensure that all members of the Native American
Church are free to engage in their religious ceremonies and practices as fully
as other inhabitants of the State of Utah, without fear of government
interference and criminal prosecution. See, Aplnt. Br. 35-56.
Similarly, the State does not counter the Defendants' argument that
affording the Utah Statutory Exemption its plain and obvious meaning as
applying to all "members of the Native American Church", honors the Utah
rule of construing statutes so as to avoid constitutional conflicts, whereas the

4 See, Aplnt. Br., at 27, n. 6 (citing restrictive state exemptions).
6

State's racial and politically restrictive interpretation of the Exemption,
subjects members of the Native American Church to criminal prosecution
for the exercise of their fundamental religious beliefs and mode of worship,
solely on the unrelated criteria of their race and political status (lack of
membership in a federally recognized Indian tribe), in violation of their
rights under the free exercise and anti-establishment provisions of Article I,
sections 1, and 4; Article HI, section 1; the equal operation of laws provision
contained in Article I, section 24, and the due process of law provision in
Article I, section /, of the Utah Constitution See, Argument, Point il,
Aplnt. Br. 35-59; see also, Provo City Corp. v. State. 795 P.2d 1120,1125
(Utah 1990) ("We have a duty to construe statues to avoid constitutional
conflicts.")
Although the State claims that "the definition of'Native American
Church' in 21 ( I K. i>l Ur U 'is notfreefromdoubt'", Aplee. Br. 20,
(emphasis supplied) this statement is inaccurate. There is no definition of
the term "Native American Church" in 21 C.F.R.§ 1307.31. None is
necessary because the Native American Church is a well-established
religion, combining elements of Christianity with traditional Native
American beliefs involving the worship of peyote as a deity and the
sacramental use of peyote in irligious rites and ceremonies. See,

7

United States v. Boyll 774 F. Supp. 1333, 1336-1337 (N.M. 1991).
The State's interpretation of the language "members of the Native
American Church" in the federal exemption incorporated in the Utah
Statutory Exemption, as excluding non-Indians, and all Native American
Indians who are not members of a federally recognized tribe, represents a
radical departure from the plain language of the federal exemption
incorporated in the Utah Statutory Exemption, and thus should be rejected
under Utah rules of statutory construction.5
IV

Federal Law Does Not Control The Interpretation Of The
Utah Statutory Exemption
The State argues that, "Nothing in Utah's laws suggest that, to the

extent the regulatory exemption was incorporated (in Utah law), it was to be
given any broader interpretation than that provided by the federal government." Aplee. Br. 8. This argument is unsupported and fails to meet the
Defendants' contention that once the federal exemption contained in 21
C.F.R. §1307.31 was incorporated in §58-37-4(2)(a)(iii) of the Utah
Controlled Substances Act, it became a Utah law (the "Utah Statutory

5 The States' reliance on the comment of BNDD official, Mr. Haislip, during the
1994 hearings on AIRFAA, that members of the NAC are "required to be Native
American", Aplee. Br., is misplaced. No evidence was offered by Mr. Haislip to
support his opinion and it is contrary to the findings of several courts which reached
the opposite conclusion based upon the testimony of NAC leaders, members and
historians, that most NAC chapters welcome members of all races. See, Boyll, supra,
at 1338-1339 (citing cases).
8

Exemption"), and thus subject to a different interpretation than the federal
exemption it incorporates, based upon the Utah Legislature's considered
approach to the subject matter of the Utah Statutory Exemption, Utah rules
of statutory construction, as well as the limitations imposed on the
construction of the Utah Statutory Exemption by the unique antiestablishment, free exercise, and equal operation of laws, provisions of the
Utah Constitution. See, Aplnt. Br. 23-24, 25-29; 49-59; see also, Blue Cross
& Blue Shield of Utah v. State, 779 P.2d 634, 637 (1989) (Utah's equal
operation of laws provision may require stricter scrutiny than the equal
protection clause of federal constitution.)
Although the State argues that "federal case law" reaffirms the alleged
"intent" of Congress to restrict the federal exemption in 21 C.F.R. §1307.31
to Native American Indians "who are members of federally recognized
tribes", Aplee. Br. 8, the State cites no federal cases that support this
argument. See, Aplee. Br., passim. This argument is also belied by the fact
that in United States v. Bovll. 774 F. Supp. 1333, (D.N.M. 1991), decided
21 years after the enactment of the federal exemption in 1970, the United
States did not contend tli.il the federal exemption was limited to Native
American Indians who were " members of a federal l\ recognized Tribe."
Instead, the United States only contended, albeit unsuccessfully, that the

9

exemption granted in 21 C.F.R.§ 1307.31, was limited to Indian members of
the Native American Church. See, Bovll, supra, at 1335 ("The United States
adopts a racially restrictive reading of 21 C.F.R. §1307.31, arguing that the
protection contained therein applies only to members of the Native
American Church who are Indian.") Thus, the State fails to present any
persuasive evidence to demonstrate that the federal exemption in 21 C.F.R.
§1307.31 was intended to encompass only Indian members of the Native
American Church who are members of a federally recognized tribe. See,
Aplnt.Br.31-34.6
The cases cited by the State in support of its argument that the federal
exemption in 21 C.F.R. §1307.31 is intended to exclude members of all
races other than Native American Indian, including Pevote Way Church of
God v. Thornburgh, 922 F.2d 1210 (5th Cir. 1991) and United States v.
Warner, 595 F. Supp. 595 (D.N.D. 1989), Aplee. Br. 16-17, erroneously
relied on the membership requirements of the Native American Church of
North America chapter of the Native American Church, that restricted its

6
It was not until the passage of AIRFAA in 1994, that the federal government
first clearly articulated an intent to protect from criminal prosecution for their
religious use of peyote, at least those members of the Native American Church who
are members of federally recognized tribes. However, AIRFAA is inclusive, not
exclusive, and did not repeal the broader exemption for "members of the Native
American Church" under 21 C.F.R. §1307.31 or the state law exemptions which
permit the religious use of peyote by all "members of the Native American Church."
See, Argument, Point VI, infra, at 16.
10

membership to Native American Indians, when, in fact, historical data,
expert testimony and the testimony of leaders and members of other Native
American Church chapters, establish that each chapter of the Native
American Church is free to determine its own membership, and that the vast
majority of Native America Church chapters, welcome members of all races
who accept the fundamental beliefs and practices of the Native American
Church. See, BoyJl, 774 F. Supp. 1333,1336-1339 (D.N.M. 1991), (MBoyJT)
"7

(distinguishing cases).
The State also fails to acknowledge that the federal district court in
Boyll supra, applying canons of federal statutory construction similar to
those employed by Utah courts, held that the language, "members of the
Native American Church" in 21 C.F.R. §1307.31, which is now incorporated
in the Utah Statutory Exemption, "is clear and unambiguous", and that "had
7 The State's claim that the remarks of BNDD representative, Mr. Sonnenreich,
during the 1970 Congressional hearings on the federal exemption, indicate that the
federal exemption was intended to extend only to Indian members of the Native
American Church, Aplee. Br. 24, is misplaced. Mr. Sonnenreich stated that the
BNDD considered the Native American Church to be "sui generis", [because]"the
history and tradition of the [Native American] church is such that there is no
question but that they regard peyote as a deity as it were." Such history and
tradition was apparently lacking in the non-Indian Church to which the BNDD had
decided to deny an exemption. See, Boyll, supra, at 1139, (citing Sonnenreich's
remarks as support for a non-racially limited interpretation of the federal
exemption); see also, Native American Church of New York v. United States, 468 F.
Supp. 1247,1249-1254 (2nd Cir. 1980), (rejecting the government's argument that
Sonnenreich's remarks support a racially restrictive interpretation of federal
exemption and citing other testimony supporting a racially inclusive interpretation
of the federal exemption).
11

the intent been to exclude non-Indian members, ... the language of the
exemption would have clearly so provided." See, Aplnt. Br. 29-34, quoting
Boyll, supra, at 1338-1340; see also, Native American Church of New York
v. United States. 468 F. Supp. 1247 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), aff d, 633 F.2d 205
(2nd Cir. 1980) (rejecting the argument that the federal exemption should
apply to Indian churches alone); Kennedy v. Bureau of Narcotics and
Dangerous Drugs, 459 F.2d 415,416-417 (9th Cir. 1972), (rejecting the
Government's proposed racial reading of the exemption: "[We] cannot say
that the Government has a lesser or different interest in protecting the health
of Indians than it has in protecting the health of non-Indians.ff)8
The State also fails to address BoyHfs finding that to construe the
racially neutral language of the exemption to provide only racially discriminatory protection, would place the exemption unnecessarily in direct
conflict with the First Amendment, and violate the canon of statutory

8 The State's criticism of Judge Burciaga's decision in Boyll as "making no
attempt to reconcile his position with any other court's contrary position", Aplee.
Br. 23, is unfounded. In Boyll, Judge Burciaga discusses and distinguishes the
earlier cases cited by the State in support of its racially restrictive interpretation of
the Utah Statutory Exemption, including Smith and Peyote Way, and acknowledges
their contrasting views. See, Boyll, at 1339 ("While there may exist some legitimate
support for the argument that Congress never intended to extend the exemption to
non-Native American Church members, see Peyote Way Church of God v. Thornburgh ..."); Boyll, at 1341 (discussing and distinguishing the factual and legal
reasons for the application of the "rational basis" review in Smith, and the
"compelling interest" test applicable to the analysis of 21 C.F.R. §1307.31.)
12

construction that federal statutes are to be construed as to avoid serious
doubts of their constitutionality." See, Boyll, supra, at 1339-1341.
V

The Federal Government's Duty To Federally Recognized
Tribes Is Not Germane To The Interpretation Of The Utah
Statutory Exemption
The State argues that its racially and politically restrictive interpre-

tation of the Utah Statutory Exemption should be sustained on the basis of
the federal government's treaties, guardian-ward relationship with, and
concomitant duties towards, federally recognized Indian tribes, Aplee. Br.
9-10,13-21. However, the State of Utah has no independent constitutional
authority to legislate on behalf of federally recognized Indian tribes.
Under the federal constitution, it is Congress that has a constitutionally based and unique relationship with federally recognized Indian
tribes, not the States. See, U.S. Const. Article VII1 11 3 ("Congress shall
have the power ...[3.] To regulate commerce with foreign nations, and
among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.") Thus, the State of
Utah has no "compelling interest" in adopting a racially and politically
restrictive interpretation of the Utah Statutory Exemption which would limit

') The State criticizes Boyjl's treatment of the history of the Native American
Church as "cursory and selective." Aplee. Br. 23. However, Judge Burciaga relied
on the testimony of eminent experts and affidavits of Native American Church
leaders, in concluding that the majority of Native American Church chapters do not
exclude non-Indians. See, Boyll, supra, at 1335-1338, and n. 2-4.
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the exemption from criminal prosecution for the religious use of peyote only
to those members of the Native American Church who are members of
federally recognized tribes. See, In re Santos Y.. 92 Cal App. 4th 1274, 1317
(2001), ("California has no independent state interest with respect to the
family relations of members of federally recognized tribes. It is Congress
that has a constitutionally based and unique relationship with federally
recognized Indian Tribes.")
The State also fails to address Defendants' argument that the State's
reliance on the line of federal cases based on Morton v. Mancari. 417 U.S.
535, 551-55 (1974),10 to support a racially and politically restrictive reading
of the Utah Statutory Exemption, Aplee. Br. 16-17, is misplaced, in light of
the United States Supreme Court's watershed decision in Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995). There, the United States
Supreme Court reviewed its prior equal protection clause decisions, and held
that henceforth, state and federal courts must apply "strict scrutiny" review
to all racial classifications. In Adarand. the Court rejected arguments similar

10 See. Rupert v. Director, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service. 957 F.2d 32.33 (1st Cir.
1992), Aplee. Br. 27, and Peyote Way Church of God v. Thornbureh. 922 F.2dl210
(5th Cir. 1991) and United States v. Warner, 595 F. Supp. 595 (D.N.D. 1989), cited
Aplee. Br. 16-17, 22.
14

to those previously asserted by the federal government in Mancari, where
the government argued that: (1) the BIA employment preference for
members of federally recognized tribes was "political" and not "racial",
because the employment preference related solely to Native American
Indians who are members of federally recognized tribes, and not to Native
American Indians as a group, and that (2) Congress had special power to
legislate on behalf of federally recognized tribes. Post-Adarand cases
indicate that if the rationale of Mancari survives at all, it pertains only to
statutes which involve "uniquely Indian concerns" and are "narrowly
tailored" to achieve those concerns. See, Argument, Point XIII, infra, at 34
(citing cases).' •
nl Mi pi ,il I IK I l u l l

Miiiplioii

The State fails to counter Defendants' argument that AIRFAA is
inclusive, not exclusive, and that the only effect of AIRFAA was to prohibit
the States from criminally prosecuting members of federally recognized
Indian tribes for their religious use of peyote in Native American Church

11 Although the State faults Boyll for failing to discuss Morton v. Mancari. Aplee.
Br. 23, the government never raised Mancari in Boyll. Additionally, Boyll involved a
challenge to the federal exemption under the "free exercise" clause of the First
Amendment, rather than an "equal protection" challenge under the Fourteenth
Amendment to which Mancari pertains. See, Argument, Point XIII, infra, at 34.
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ceremonies. Compare, Aplnt. Br. 45-49 and Aplee. Br. 15-17. In this regard,
AIRFAA simply provides that: (1) "Notwithstanding any other provision of
law,... the use, possession, or transportation of peyote by an Indian for bona
fide traditional ceremonial purposes in connection with the practice of a
traditional Indian religion is lawful, and shall not be prohibited by the United
States or any State." See, AIRFAA, 42 U.S.C. § 1996a (b)(1), (Emphasis
supplied), Aplnt. Br. 14. Under AIRFAA, the term "Indian" is defined as a
member of a federally recognized tribe. See, Id., 42 U.S.C. § 1996a (c)(l)(2).
"Congress does not legislate in a vacuum", Thinking Machines Corp.
v. Mellon Fin. Servs. Corp. #1 (In re Thinking Machines). 67 F.3d 1021,
1025 (1st Cir. 1995), and Congress was well aware of the existence of the
federal exemption in 21 C.F.R. §1307.31 and the twenty eight state law
exemptions at the time AIRFAA was enacted. See, AIRFAA, 42 U.S.C.
§1996a(a)(2)(3), Aplnt. Br., Add. 14. Thus, had Congress intended to repeal
the broader exemption for "members of the Native American Church" in 21
C.F.R. §1307.31, or the 28 state law exemptions that incorporate the federal
exemption expressly or in substance, such intent would be plainly expressed

16

in AIRFAA.12
Because the Utah Statutory Exemption, encompassing all "members of
the Native American Church", is more expansive than the exemption granted
in AIRFAA for members of the Native American Church who are also
members of a federally recognized tribe, all individuals exempted from
criminal prosecution under AIRFAA are also exempt under the Utah
Statutory Exemption. Accordingly, the State's claim that AIRFAA should be
read as a back-handed repeal of the Utah Statutory Exemption, is
unwarranted and should be rejected. The State's restrictive interpretation of
the Exemption should also be rejected because such an interpretation
unnecessarily puts AIRFAA at constitutional loggerheads with the Equal
Operation of Laws provision of Article 1, section 24, of the Utah
Constitution, and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
See, Argument, Point IX and Point XIV, infra, at 22 and 34.

12 The comment of BNDD official, Mr. Haislip, that AIRFAA would "make
statutory the protection now provided by federal regulation and the laws of 28
States for the religious use of peyote by 'Indian practitioners'", Aplee. Br. 21,
although accurate, ignores the fact that the exemptions of many of the 28 states he
references, encompass all members of the Native American Church, and not just
Indian members of the Church, or Indians who are also members of federally
recognized tribes. See, Aplnt. Br. 27-29, n. 7-9 (discussing state law exemptions). Mr.
Haislip's remarks also give no indication that AIRFAA is intended to repeal any of
these more expansive state law exemptions or the federal exemption in 21 C.F.R.
§1307.31.
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Although the State argues that AIRFAA indicates that a racially and
politically restrictive interpretation of the Utah Statutory Exemption is
necessary to advance the "federal government's compelling interest" in
fulfilling its duty to protect the culture and religion of Indians who are
members of federally recognized tribes, Aplee. Br. 15-17, 18, n.8, the
Defendants have previously demonstrated that the State of Utah has no
such "compelling interest" because it is the federal government that has the
constitutional responsibility for legislating on behalf of federally recognized
tribes. See, Aplnt. Br. 13. Moreover, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit recently held that the federal government failed to show that its
regulation denying access to eagle feathers by Indians who were not
members of a federally recognized tribe was "the least restrictive
alternative" to advance the federal government's trust relationship and duties
toward federally recognized tribes. Accordingly, the Court held that the
regulation denied the "free exercise" rights of Native Americans who are not
members of a federally recognized tribe to use eagle feathers for religious
purposes. See, United States v. Hardman, 297 F.2d 1116,1128-1129, 11331134 (10th Cir. 2002), vacating, rehearing and affirming In the Matter of
Saenz, No. 00-2166 (10th Cir. 2001), Aplnt. Br. 46-48, 64-65. Thus, in the
case at bar, the State has not delineated any "compelling interest" of the
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State of Utah in adopting a racially and politically restrictive interpretation
of the Utah Statutory Exemption that would override the rights of members
of the Defendant Native American Church who are not Native American
Indians, or who are not members of a federally recognized Indian tribe, to
freely exercise their fundamental religious right to worship peyote as a deity
and sacrament within the State of Utah.
Finally, the State's contention that it has found "no federal court
opinions issued after AIRFAA's enactment which have extended the federal
peyote exemption to non-Indians, Aplee. Br. 25, is untenable, because the
State fails to cite any case in which a federal court has been asked to do so.
VII The Constitutional Claims Presented In This Appeal Were
Preserved In The Lower Court And The State Agreed
To Their Adjudication Based Upon The Exceptional
Circumstances Advanced By Defendants
Although the State argues that the Defendants have failed to preserve
their claims that the racially and politically restrictive interpretation of the
Utah Statutory Exemption violates the anti-establishment and free exercise
provisions of Article I, sections land 4; Article III, section 1; the equal
operation of the laws provisions of Article I, section 24; and the due process
of law provisions of Article I, section 7, of the Utah Constitution, Aplee. Br.
45-49, these issues were preserved in the lower court, and the State agreed to
the determination of these issues based on the exceptional circumstances
19

asserted by Defendants in support of their petition for this interlocutory
appeal. See, Preservation of Issues For Review In The District Court, Aplnt.
Br. 5.13
On October 3, 2001, the Defendants filed a Petition for Permission
To File An Interlocutory Appeal in this case, listing the Defendants' claims
under the Utah Constitution on which Defendants proposed to appeal, and
specifying the "exceptional circumstances" which necessitated interlocutory
consideration of these issues. See,fflj2,3 and 4, Petition, Add. 16, at 9-13.
On October 26, 2001, the State responded to the Petition with a letter
to the Court indicating that the State "does not oppose the granting of the
petition on the question of whether provisions of the U.S. and Utah Constitutions, as well as state and federal statutes, prohibit the prosecution of nonIndian members of the Native American Church on charges or drug
possession and distribution ... The State therefore does not oppose the
petition with respect to the legal and constitutional questions as stated
above." See, Letter to Pat Bartholomew from Brett J. DelPorto, Assistant

13 Although the Defendants' ''establishment" claim regarding the State's
proposed interpretation of the Utah Statutory Exemption is not presented as
explicitly as their "free exercise" claim under the Utah Constitution, the discussion
of the "free exercise" clauses of the Utah Constitution intrinsically requires
consideration of the "anti-establishment" clauses of the Utah Constitution, because
of their dynamic interaction and tension. See, Franco v. The Church of Jesus Christ
of LPS, 2001 UT 25,21 P.3d 198, J. Durham (concurring), at ^42,209.
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Attorney General, dated October 26, 2001, Add. 17. In the same letter, the
State agreed that the resolution of the Defendants' claims under the state and
federal constitutions "would materially affect whether the petitioners have a
viable defense to the prosecution." Id.
Based upon the foregoing, the State has waived any argument that the
Defendants failed to preserve their claims under the Utah Constitution in the
lower court and/or that the Defendants have failed to establish exceptional
circumstances for the determination of these issues in this appeal. Thus, the
State's strategic failure to respond to the Defendants' claims under the Utah
Constitution in no way precludes the Court from deciding these claims on the
merits.
VIII The State's Interpretation Of The Utah Statutory Exemption
Violates The Defendants' Rights Under Article I, Sections 1
And 4, And Article III, Section 1, Of The Utah Constitution
The State does not challenge the Defendants' arguments that a racially
and politically restrictive interpretation of the Utah Statutory Exemption
violates the Defendants' rights under the "anti-establishment" and "free
exercise" provisions of Article I, Sections 1 and 4, and Article III, section 1,
of the Utah Constitution, because such a restrictive interpretation would: (1)
interfere with the Defendant Native American Church's authority to
determine its own membership; (2) establish de facto racial and political
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qualifications for membership in the Defendant Native American Church;
(3) subject the Defendants and other members of the Defendant Oklevueha
Native American Church to criminal prosecution because of their "mode of
worship", i.e. the worship of peyote as a deity and sacrament, and (4)
unreasonably entangle the State in the supervision and operation of the
Defendant Church. See, Argument, Point II, Aplnt. Br. 35-48.14 Thus., the
Court should reject the State's racially and politically restrictive interpretation of the Utah Statutory Exemption and hold that the Exemption extends
to the nondrug, religious use of peyote by all members of the Defendant
Native American Church in bona fide Church ceremonies, regardless of their
race or lack of membership in a federally recognized tribe.
IX

The State's Interpretation Of The Utah Statutory Exemption
Violates the Defendants' Right To The Equal Operation Of
The Laws Under Article I, Section 24, Of The Utah Constitution
The State fails to demonstrate that its racially and politically

restrictive interpretation of the Utah Statutory Exemption, is (1) reasonable;
and (2) has more than a speculative tendency to actually further any valid

14 The State is already contemplating litigation to establish a "definition of the
NAC" and to determine "whether Defendants fit within it." See, Aplee. Br. 19, n. 9.
The State fails to appreciate that the Defendant Native American Church, not the
State, has the legal right to define Church doctrine and qualifications for membership, and that the State's interference in these matters is prohibited by the
provisions of Article I, sections 1 and 4, and Article HI, section 1, of the Utah
Constitution.
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legislative purpose; and (3) is reasonably necessary to further a legitimate
legislative goal. See, Aplnt. Br. 49-56. Hence, the Court should hold that
the State's restrictive interpretation of the Utah Statutory Exemption violates
the Defendants' right to the Equal Operation Of The Laws under Article I,
section 24, of the Utah Constitution, because such an interpretation would
operate to restrict and punish, through the mechanism of the State's criminal
prosecution system, similarly situated members of the Defendant Native
American Church for engaging in their fundamental religious practices
involving the worship of peyote as a deity and sacrament, solely on the basis
of unrelated characteristics, including race and membership in a federally
recognized tribe. See, Argument, Point II, Aplnt. Br. 49-56.
X

The State's Interpretation Of The Utah Statutory Exemption
Violates The Defendants' Right To Due Process Of Law
Under Article 1, Section 7, Of The Utah Constitution
The State argues that, "[B]ecause the definition of'Native American

Church' in the federal exemption incorporated in the Utah Statutory
Exemption, is 'not free from doubt', attention must turn to the intent behind
the regulation." Aplee. Br. 20. However, the State did not give the
Defendant Church and its spiritual leaders, the benefit of this "doubt", when
it prosecuted them on multiple racketeering and felony drug distribution
charges.
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Assuming, as the State asserts, that such a "doubt" exists, the State
fails to counter the Defendants' argument that it was reasonable for
Defendants to believe that their nondrug, religious use of peyote was
protected under the Utah Statutory Exemption, based upon the fact that the
New Mexico Court in Bovll had previously ruled that the federal exemption,
as incorporated in the Utah Statutory Exemption, applied to all members of
the Defendant Native American Church regardless of their race. See, f 8,
Aplnt. Br. 16.
To the extent that the State's racially and politically restrictive
interpretation of the Utah Statutory Exemption is correct, which Defendants
dispute, the lower court erred in refusing to grant the Defendants' motion to
dismiss the charges against them, because the interpretation of the Utah
Statutory Exemption advocated by the State, renders the Exemption vague as
applied to Defendants, in violation of their rights to due process of law under
Article 1, section 7, and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, because "men and women of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application," Greenwood
v. City of North Salt Lake, 817 P.2d 816, 819 (Utah 1991). See, Aplnt. Br.
56-59. Thus, the Court should either rule that the Utah Statutory Exemption
extends to all members of the Native American Church, or rule that the
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Defendants' reasonable reliance on Boyll precludes the State's criminal
prosecution of the Defendants, because the Exemption failed to afford the
Defendants reasonable notice that their conduct was prohibited. See,
Greenwood, supra, at 819.
XI

The State's Racially And Politically Restrictive Interpretation
Of The Utah Statutory Exemption Violates The Defendants'
Rights Under The Free Exercise Clause Of The First Amendment

A.

The "Compelling Interest" Test Applies To The Analysis Of
Utah Statutory Exemption Because It Is Not A Generally
Applicable Law
The Defendants claim that the State's racially and politically

restrictive interpretation of the Utah Statutory Exemption violates their
rights under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment to the federal
constitution. Aplnt. Br. 59-60. Although the State argues that the "rational
basis" test utilized in Employment Div. Pep, of Human Resources v. Smith.
494 U.S. 872 (1990), applies to the adjudication of the Defendants" free
exercise claim, Aplee. Br. 39, this argument is incorrect, because Smith
involved an ostensibly "neutral, generally applicable law", whereas the Utah
Statutory Exemption is specifically directed to religious practices of a
particular group: members of the Native American Church, and is not a
"generally applicable law" within the ambit of Smith. Thus, the Defendants'
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free exercise claim must be assessed under the traditional "compelling
interest" test. See, Aplnt. Br. 41-42 (citing cases).
B.

The State's Racially And Politically Restrictive Interpretation Of
The Utah Statutory Exemption Substantially Burdens The Free
Exercise Of Religion Of Native American Church Members Who
Are Non-Indian, Or Who Are Indian But Are Not Members Of A
Federally Recognized Tribe
The State does not dispute that its restrictive interpretation of the Utah

Statutory Exemption would substantially burden the Defendants' religious
beliefs, as the lower court found. Compare, Ruling, at 4, Aplnt. Br., Add. 1
at 4; Aplnt. Br. 39, discussing Boyll, 774 F. Supp. 1333, 1341-1342 (D.N.M.
1991) (citing cases), and Aplee. Br. 37-44. Instead, the State argues that it
has "compelling interests" which support its racially and politically
restrictive interpretation of the Utah Statutory Exemption that would
override the Defendants' right to freely exercise their religion. Aplee. Br.
39-44.
C.

Utah Has No "Compelling Interest" In Adopting The Racially
And Politically Restrictive Interpretation of the Utah Statutory
Exemption Advocated By The State
The State characterizes the Defendants' argument as "contending that

the State failed to prove that its racially and religiously restrictive
interpretation of C.F.R. was the least restrictive alternative means of
achieving the interest of the State", Aplee. Br. 38. However, the Defendants'
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arguments are, in fact, more fundamental: (1) the Utah Statutory Exemption,
and not the federal exemption, is at issue; and (2) the State of Utah has no
"compelling [governmental] interest" that supports a racially and politically
restrictive interpretation of the Utah Statutory Exemption. See, Aplnt. Br.
43-48, 59-60.15
The State argues that it has two "compelling interests'1 which support
its racially and politically restrictive interpretation of the Utah Statutory
Exemption: (1) protecting tribal Native Americans, i.e. members of federally
recognized tribes, and preserving their culture and self-government; and (2)
protecting society from illegal drug use. Aplee. Br. 9, 39-44.
1.

Obligation To Federally Recognized Tribes
The State argues that its racially and politically restrictive interpre-

tation of the Utah Statutory Exemption as embracing only members of
federally recognized Indian tribes, should be sustained on the basis of the

15
The State argues that "because defendants rely on a federal exemption, they
should be bound by the federal interpretation of the exemption", Aplee. Br. 20, yet
the State argues that the Tenth Circuit's decision in Saenz, as affirmed in Hardman,
is inapplicable because these cases were decided under RFRA, which only applies to
the federal government. Aplee. Br. 30-31. This is a distinction without a difference,
because the "compelling interest" test applicable under RFRA, is also applicable to
the Defendants9 "free exercise" claim under Article 1, sections 1 and 4, and Article
III, section 1, of the Utah Constitution, and the First Amendment to the United
States Constitution. See, Aplnt. Br. 42-43 (Utah Constitution); See, Aplnt. Br. 59-60
(First Amendment).
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federal government's treaties, guardian-ward relationship with, and
concomitant duties towards, federally recognized Indian tribes. Aplee. Br.
9-10,13-21. However, the Defendants have already established that the
State of Utah has no such duties, and hence, no "compelling interest" in
preferring the rights of Native American Church members who are members
of federally recognized tribes, over the rights of Native American Church
members who are not members of federally recognized tribes. Aplnt. Br. 13.
Thus, the federal government's trust duties in respect to federally recognized
tribes do not furnish any "compelling interest" for the State of Utah that
would support a racially and politically restrictive interpretation of the Utah
Statutory Exemption.
2.

Illegal Drug Use
The State of Utah undoubtedly has an interest in protecting society

from "illegal" drug use, Aplee. Br. 40-41. However, that interest is not
implicated in the instant case, because the non-drug, religious use of peyote
by members of the Native American Church in bona fide Church services, is
not "illegal" under the Utah Statutory Exemption. The very existence of the
Utah Statutory Exemption manifests the "compelling interest" of the State of
Utah, declared in Article I, Sections 1 and 4, and Article III, section 1, of the
Utah Constitution, in protecting the free exercise of religion for all members
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of the Native American Church, who might otherwise be prosecuted under
the state's generally applicable drug laws, because of their "mode of
worship", as referenced in Article III, section 1, of the Utah Constitution,
including their use of peyote as a sacrament and medicine in bona fide
Native American Church ceremonies. See, Aplnt. Br. 44, citing Church of
Lukumi Babalu Ave, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 546-547 (1993) (an
interest served by a statute is not compelling where the statutory framework
permits derogation of that interest.)
Moreover, the non-drug, religious use of peyote by Native American
Church members is non-controversial. The State has presented no evidence
to demonstrate that the religious use of peyote by members of the Native
American Church who are non-Indian, or Indians who are not members of
federally recognized tribes, poses any more of a "substantial threat to public
health, safety and welfare", than similar use by members of the Native
American Church who are members of federally recognized tribes. In fact,
there is no such threat. In the more than 30 years since the adoption of the
federal exemption contained in 21 C.F.R. §1307.31, the majority of Native
American Church chapters have opened their doors to members of all races
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and political affiliations,16 and no abuse of peyote by Native American
Church members, Indian or non-Indian, has been reported. See, Aplnt. Br.
43-45 and n. 13.
The State has failed to identify any "compelling interest" of the State
of Utah that would be undermined if the Defendants' interpretation of the
Utah Statutory Exemption prevails. Thus, this Court should find that the
criminal prosecution of the Defendants under the State's racially and
politically restrictive interpretation of the Utah Statutory Exemption violates
their right to the free exercise of their religion under the First Amendment.
XII The State's Racially And Politically Restrictive Interpretation
Of The Utah Statutory Exemption Violates The Defendants'
Rights Under The Establishment Clause Of The First Amendment
In Franco v. The Church of Jesus Christ of LPS, 2001 UT 25, 21 P.3d
198,202-203, this Court outlined the principles applicable to the analysis of
a claim of unconstitutionality under the First Amendment to the federal
constitution. The Court observed that the United States Supreme Court in
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), explained that the Establishment
Clause does not merely prohibit the establishment of a state Church, but
16 See, U.S. v. Boyll, supra, at 1336 ("Historically, the church has been hospitable
to and, in fact, has proselytized non-Indians. The vast majority of Native American
Church congregations, like most conventional congregations, maintains an 'open
door' policy and does not exclude persons on the basis of their race. Racial restrictions to membership have never been a general part of the Peyote religion or of the
Native American Church.")
10

commands "that there should be 'no law respecting an establishment of
religion.' Id. at 612." "Accordingly, laws that do not establish a religion but
that are a step that could lead to such establishment", may violate the First
Amendment." Franco, supra, at 203.
In Franco, the Court also noted that Lemon and subsequent cases have
employed a three part test to determine whether a government regulation or
statute constitutes a law "respecting an establishment of religion." In order
to survive an Establishment Clause challenge under the Lemon test, the
action or law, "(1) must have a "secular legislative purpose"; (2) must
"neither advance nor inhibit religion"; and (3) must not foster "an excessive
government entanglement with religion." See, Franco, supra, at 203. A
challenged action or law is valid "only if it satisfies all three parts of the
Lemon test." Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 583, 107 S.Ct. 2573,
2577(1987).
The State does not contest the Defendants' argument that its racially
and politically restrictive interpretation of the Utah Statutory Exemption
violates the Defendants' rights under the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment. Compare, Aplnt. Br. 1J5, at 4,18-20, 39-42, 59-60, and Aplee.
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Br. 37-44.17 The State fails to present any evidence to show that its
interpretation of the Utah Statutory Exemption has any valid "secular
legislative purpose." See, Lemon, supra, at 612-613. Additionally, the
State's proposed interpretation of the Utah Statutory Exemption also
"inhibits religion", See, Id., because members of the Native American
Church who are non-Indian, or who are Indian but are not members of a
federally recognized tribe, cannot worship peyote as a deity or use it as a
sacrament in bona fide Native American Church ceremonies, without being
subjected to racketeering and felony drug prosecution by the State, as
exemplified by the State's prosecution of the Defendants in this case.
The State's racially and politically restrictive interpretation of the
Utah Statutory Exemption would have the sure effect of imposing a racial
exclusion to membership in the Defendant Native American Church itself,
because the use of peyote by Native American Church members is the
essence of their religion. "To exclude individuals of a particular race from
being members of a recognized religious faith is offensive to the very heart
of the First Amendment... There can be no more excessive entanglement of
17
Although the State claims that "Defendants made no establishment clause
argument below and present none on appeal", Aplee. Br. 26, fn.10, this is incorrect.
See, Memorandum In Support of Motion To Dismiss, Case No. 36 at 167-169; see
also, Petition For Permission To Appeal An Inter-Iocutory Order, ^[2 at 9, Add. 16,
and State's letter to the Court agreeing to adjudication of the claims presented in
the Petition. See, Aplnt. Br., Add. 17.
12

government with religion than the government's attempt to impose a racial
restriction to membership in a religious organization." See, Boyjl, supra, at
1339-1340 (citing cases). To exclude members of the Native American
Church based on their political status, i.e. membership in a federally
recognized tribe, would similarly offend the First Amendment.
In the present case, the Defendant Native American Church has
determined to open its membership to all individuals, regardless of race or
political status regarding membership in a federally recognized tribe. As this
Court observed in Franco, "Churches must have 'the power to decide for
themselves, free from state interference, matters of church government, as
well as those of faith and doctrine.' " Franco, supra, at ^[15, quoting Kedroff
v. St. Nicholas Cathedral. 344 U.S. 94 (1952).
Based upon the foregoing, the Court should find that the State's
racially and politically restrictive interpretation of the Utah Statutory
Exemption, violates the Defendants' rights under the Establishment Clause
of the First Amendment.
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XIII The State's Racially And Politically Restrictive Interpretation
Of The Utah Statutory Exemption Violates The Equal Protection
Clause Of The Fourteenth Amendment
The State argues that "rational basis" rather than "strict scrutiny"
review applies to the Defendants' claim that the State's racially and
politically restrictive interpretation of the Utah Statutory Exemption, violates
their rights under the Equal Protection Clause, because the Exemption is
allegedly "rationally related to the government's unique duty and responsibility" for federally recognized tribes." Aplee. Br. 26-28. However, as
previously discussed, the State of Utah has no such duty and responsibility.
See, Point V, infra, at 13-15. Therefore, the racially and politically
restrictive interpretation of the Utah Statutory Exemption urged by the State,
is not "rationally related" to any legitimate legislative purpose of the State of
Utah, and "strict scrutiny" review is required.
Similarly, the State's reliance on Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535
(1974) ("Mancari"), to support its argument for a "rational basis" review of
its interpretation of the Utah Statutory Exemption isflawed,because the
regulation in Mancari was upheld based upon a constitutional duty expressly
conferred on the federal government in regard to federally recognized tribes.
Thus, the "rational basis" test of Mancari has no application to the adjudication of the Defendants' claim that the State's interpretation of the Utah

Statutory Exemption denies them Equal Protection of the Laws under the
Fourteenth Amendment.
The narrow scope ofMancari is further illuminated by the United
States Supreme Court's more recent decision in Adarand Constructors, Inc.
v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995). There, the United States Supreme Court held
that all race-based presumptions favorable to minorities are to be subject to
"strict scrutiny" under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. In
so holding, the Court defined three basic propositions that define equal
protection jurisprudence: "(1) skepticism - that any preference based on
racial or ethnic criteria requires searching examination and is inherently
suspect; (2) consistency - that the standard of review is not dependent on the
race of those burdened; and (3) congruence - that equal protection analysis
under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution is the same as under the
Fourteenth Amendment." See, In re Santos Y„ supra, at 1318-1320,
discussing Adarand, supra, at 223-224.
Adarand was decided over the dissent of Justice Stevens who noted
that the majority's opinion basically eviscerated the Court's prior ruling in
Mancari. Justice Stevens noted that the Court's conclusion in Mancari, that
the BIA's hiring preference for Native Americans who are one fourth or
more degree Indian blood and a member of a Federally-recognized tribe,
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was "political, not racial", because it did not encompass all Indian tribes,
was similar to the argument rejected by the majority in Adarand. where the
Court found that the small business preference was racial, even though not
all members of the preferred minority groups were eligible for the
preference. See, In re Santos Y., supra, at 244-245, n.3.
Justice Stevens also observed that Mancari's reliance on the plenary
power of Congress to legislate on behalf of Indian tribes paralleled the
government's unsuccessful argument in Adarand concerning the power
granted to Congress under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to
legislate on behalf of minorities. See, In re Santos Y.. supra, at 1318-1320,
discussing Adarand. supra, at 223-224. Thus, subsequent to Adarand. the
courts have held that Mancari was solely concerned with issues of tribal
sovereignty and did not support limiting an individual's free exercise rights
based on the unrelated distinctions in political status, such as an individual's
membership, or lack of membership, in a federally recognized tribe.
Accordingly, the courts have limited application of the rational basis test to
legislation involving 'uniquely Indian concerns.' The test applied is whether
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the classification serves a "compelling governmental interest" and is
1 O

"narrowly tailored" to achieve its goal.
Here, the right of members of the Defendant Native American Church
to freely practice their fundamental religious beliefs and practices involving
the worship of peyote as a deity and sacrament, do not involve "uniquely
Indian concerns", because many members of the Native American Church
are not Native American Indians. Boyll supra, at 1336-1338, Aplnt. Br. fflj
1-3, at 13-14. The fact that the membership of the Native American Church
originally consisted only of Native American Indians, did not preclude the
majority of Native American Church chapters from deciding to admit
individuals of other races as members of the Church over the years. Thus,
the fundamental precepts of religious freedom and non-interference of
government with religion declared in the Utah Constitution must expand to
address this social development. Fortunately, "[T]he scope of guarantees
under the Utah Constitution is not limited by their historical roots." See,
American Fork City v. Cosgrove, 701 P.2d 1069,1073 (Utah 1985), (per
Durham, J.).
18 See, e.g., In re Santos Y., supra, at 1319-1323; In the Matter of Saenz. No. 002166 (10th Cir. 2001), affd sub. nom., United States v. Hardman, 297 F.3d 1116,
1119-1120 (10th Cir. 2002) (holding that Mancari was solely concerned with issues of
tribal sovereignty and did not support limiting an individual's free exercise rights
involving use of eagle feathers to members of federally recognized tribes); Meyers v.
Board of Education of San Juan, 905 F. Supp. 1544,1569-1570 (Utah 1995).
M

The State has failed to demonstrate that it has both a "compelling
interest" in adopting a racially and politically restrictive interpretation of the
Utah Statutory Exemption, and that its restrictive interpretation of the
Exemption is the "least restrictive alternative" of achieving any such
compelling interest. Therefore, the Court should hold that the criminal
prosecution of the Defendants under the States' racially and politically
restrictive interpretation of the Utah Statutory Exemption, violates their
rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
and reverse the lower court's ruling denying the Defendants' Motion To
Dismiss on this ground.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, the Defendant Oklevueha Earthwalks
Native American Church of Utah and the Defendants James and Linda
Mooney, respectfully pray that this Court find that the State's racially and
politically restrictive interpretation of the Utah Statutory Exemption violates
the Defendants' state and federal constitutional rights for the reasons
discussed herein. Defendants further pray that the Court declare that the
Utah Statutory Exemption extends to all members of the Native American
Church, regardless of race, or political status regarding membership in a
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federally recognized tribe, and reverse the lower court's denial of the
Defendants' Motion To Dismiss the criminal charges against them.
Alternatively, the Defendants pray that the Court declare that the
Utah Statutory Exemption is unconstitutionally vague as applied to the
Defendants, such that the State's criminal prosecution of the Defendants
violates their rights to due process of law under Article I, section 7, of the
Utah Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, and reverse the lower court's denial of the Defendants' Motion
To Dismiss the criminal charges against them on this ground.
DATED AND RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 12th day of
May, 2003.

iTHRmCQLLARD
Attorney for Appellants--._
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that on this 12th day of May, 2003,1 had two (2) true
and correct copies of the above and foregoing Appellants' Reply Brief, hand
delivered to Ms. Kris C. Leonard and Mr. Mark Shurtleff, Office of the Utah
Attorney General, Attorneys for Plaintiff, at their offices located at 160 East
300 South, 6th Floor, Salt Lake City, UT, 84114 - 0854.

iRD
Attorney for Appellants
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ADDENDUM

yuii
KATHRYN COLLARD, St. Bar No. 0697
THE LAW FIRM OF KATHRYN COLLARD, LC
Attorney and Co-Counsel for Defendants
9 Exchange Place, Suite 1111
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Tel: (801) 537-5625
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

JAMES W. MOONEY
aka: James W.F.E. Mooney
7592 South 3200 West
Benjamin, UT 84660
DOB: 01/03/19444

PETITION FOR PERMISSION TO
APPEAL AN INTERLOCUTORY
ORDER
Subject To Assignment to Court of Appeals
Dist.Ct. No. 001404536

and
LINDA T. MOONEY
aka: Linda B.H.W. Mooney
7295 South 3200 West
Benjamin, UT 84660
and

Dist.Ct.No. 00140537

OKLEVUEHA EARTHWALKS
NATIVE AMERICAN CHURCH
OF UTAH, INC.,

Dist. Ct. No. 001404538

Defendants.
The Defendant Oklevueha Earthwalks Native American Church and its spiritual
leaders, James Warren Flaming Eagle Mooney and his wife, Linda Mooney, by and
through their counsel, Kathryn Collard, hereby petition this Court for an Order pursuant
to Rule 5 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, permitting Defendants to appeal

from the interlocutory Ruling On Defendants' Motion To Dismiss issued by the
Honorable Gary D. Stott in the above entitled cases on or about September 13, 2001, a
copy of which is attached hereto as Addendum A. The Court has jurisdiction of an
interlocutory appeal from any court of record involving a charge of a first degree or
capital felony under Section 78-2-2 (3) (h), Utah Code Annotated (1953), as amended.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On November 27, 2000, the State, by and through the Utah County Attorney,
charged the Oklevueha Earth Walks Native American Church of Utah, Inc., ("Oklevueha
Native American Church"), and its spiritual leaders, the Defendants James Warren
Flaming Eagle Mooney and his wife, Linda Mooney, with twelve first degree felony
counts of "controlled substance criminal enterprise" pursuant to Utah Code Annotated,
Section 58-37-8, and one second degree count of racketeering or "pattern of unlawful
activity" pursuant to Section 76-10-1603.! Conviction of each first degree felony count
carries a penalty of not less than five (5) years imprisonment. The State also seeks a
forfeiture of the Defendant Church and its property in Utah County pursuant to Section
58-37-13. A copy of the Information charging the Defendants is attached hereto as
Addendum B.
It is undisputed that at all times referred to in the Information filed against the
Defendants, the Defendant Oklevueha Native American Church was recognized as a bona
fide Native American Church and that the defendant James Warren Flaming Eagle
Mooney was legally authorized to obtain peyote in Texas by the Texas Department of
Public Safety under regulations promulgated under the auspices of the United States Drug
1

All statutory references are to Utah Code Annotated (1953), as amended, unless
otherwise specified.
2

Enforcement Agency. See, Affidavit of Salvador Johnson, Addendum C, attached, at 4,
and Addendum D, Tabs 13 and 14.
Defendant James Warren Flaming Eagle Mooney is an individual of Native
American Indian descent. See, Affidavit of James Warren Flaming Eagle Mooney, para.
3, Addendum E, Exhibit 1 thereto.2 Mr. Mooney has a long history as a Native
American Church member and medicine man. Defendant Mooney has received awards
from Governor Michael O. Leavitt and the Utah Department of Corrections for his
outstanding contributions in providing Native American religious services to inmates of
the Central Utah Correctional Facility. Defendant Mooney has been trained and qualified
as a police officer and has also received recognition for his efforts to assist in controlling
the problem of unlawful drugs in the town of Hurricane, Utah, where he formerly resided.
See, Addendum D, Tabs 2-9. Defendant Linda Mooney has also been active in bringing
Native American religious services to inmates at the Central Utah Correctional Facility.
See, Addendum D, Tab 10.
The Defendant Oklevueha Earth Walks Native American Church of Utah, Inc., is a
duly established non-profit corporation existing and operating under the laws of the State
of Utah, since April, 1997, when it was founded by Defendant James Mooney, who also
serves as its medicine man or "roadman." See, Addendum D, Tab 11. The Oklevueha
Native American Church, like many other congregations within the Native American

2

Although the district court's Ruling states that "no official evidence presented to this
Court to show that the Defendants are legitimately of Indian heritage", Ruling, at 9,
Addendum 1, this finding is incorrect and ignores Defendant Mooney's unrebutted
sworn statements regarding his Native American ancestry contained in his Affidavit
submitted in support of Defendants1 Motion to Dismiss. Under Rule 803 (19) of the Utah
Rules of Evidence, an individual's sworn statement regarding his ancestry is admissible
and is not hearsay, even if the declarant is available.
3

Church, welcomes members of all races who embrace its fundamental beliefs and
practices. See, Addendum D, Tab 12. See, Affidavit of James Warren Flaming Eagle
Mooney, Paras. 3-12, Addendum E, Exhibit 1 thereto.
All of the foregoing criminal charges against the Defendants arose from the
conduct of the Defendants James and Linda Mooney, in providing peyote to members of
the Defendant Oklevueha Native American Church in religious ceremonies conducted in
the Church facilities in the City of Benjamin, Utah County, State of Utah.
At the preliminary hearing, the witnesses subpoenaed by the State testified that
they were either members or invited visitors of members of the Defendant Oklevueha
Native American Church. They testified that they had received peyote from James or
Linda Mooney in their capacity as spiritual leaders in Native American religious
ceremonies conducted at the Defendant Church.
The State's witnesses testified that although members of the Oklevueha Native
American Church were encouraged to make financial donations to support the Church,
Church members were not required to make donations to the Church, and were not
required to make donations to participate in any Church ceremonies, including peyote
ceremonies. Witnesses for the State also testified that the worship of peyote as a
sacrament and deity is fundamental to the Native American religion of the Defendant
Oklevueha Native American Church and that the Church viewed the non-religious use of
peyote as a sacrilege.
The Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the criminal charges against them on
several grounds. First, Defendants contended that they have a right to use and provide
peyote to Church members in religious ceremonies of the Oklevueha Native American
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Church recognized under the Utah Controlled Substances Act, Section 58-37-1 et seq.,
which incorporates the federal exemption for the religious use of peyote by members of
the Native American Church.3 A copy of the Act is contained in Addendum D, Tab 16.
Section 58-37-2(4) defines the term "controlled substance" as including all of the
drugs listed in Schedules I through V of the Utah Controlled Substances Act, as well as
all of the drugs listed in Schedules I through V of the Federal Controlled Substances Act.
Peyote is listed as a "controlled substance" under Schedule I (2)(a) of Section 58-37-4.
Section 58-37-4 (iii) provides that "Unless specifically excepted or unless listed in
another schedule, any material, compound, mixture, containing....(Q) peyote", is a
Schedule I controlled substance. Schedule I of the Federal Controlled Substances Act
contains a specific exception from criminal prosecution codified at Section 1307.31 of
the Code of Federal Regulations. This regulation provides:
The listing of peyote as a controlled substance in Schedule I
does not apply to the nondrug use of peyote in bona fide
religious ceremonies of the Native American Church, and
members of the Native American Church so using peyote
are exempt from registration. Any person who manufactures
peyote for or distributes peyote to a Native American Church
is required to register annually and to comply with all other
requirements of law.
See, CFR, section 130731, Addendum D, Tab 15.

3

The Native American Church consists of a number of loosely affiliated local chapters.
Each chapter is responsible for establishing its own charter. Each congregation makes its
own rules, just as each meeting is conducted by its own roadman
The "Church" refers
to a body of believers and their shared practices, rather than the existence of a formal
structure or a membership roll. Membership in the Native American Church derives from
the sincerity of one's beliefs and participation in its ceremonies.... Although one
branch of the Native American Church is known to restrict membership to Native
Americans, most other branches of the Church do not. As a result, non-Indian members
are accepted within the Native American Church. United States v. Boyll, 774 F. Supp.
1333, 1336 (D.N.M. 1991), affd, 1992 WL 138485 (10th Cir.) (unpublished opinion).
5

Because the use of peyote by Native American Church members in bona fide
religious ceremonies of the Native American Church is specifically excepted from
criminal prosecution under Schedule I of the Federal Controlled Substances Act, this
exception is also incorporated in the Utah Controlled Substances Act, under Section 5837-4 (iii). Thus, Defendants contend they areexempt from criminal prosecution under the
Utah Controlled Substances Act for their nondrug use of peyote in bona fide religious
services as members of the Oklevueha Native American Church.
Defendants also moved to dismiss the criminal charges against them pursuant to
Article 1, Sections 1 and 4 of the Utah Constitution and the First Amendment of the
United States Constitution. The Utah Constitution arguably provides for stronger
protection for religious beliefs than the federal Constitution. Article I, Section 1 of the
Utah Constitution, declares, in part, that "All men have the inherent and inalienable right
... to worship according to the dictates of their own consciences," and Article 1, Section
4, provides, in part, that 'The rights of conscience shall never be infringed. The State
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof." UTAH CONST., Art. I, sees. 1, 4. The First Amendment to the United States
Constitution provides, in part, that: "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof."
Defendants argued that the free exercise of their fundamental religious beliefs and
practices, including their use of peyote in religious ceremonies of the Oklevueha Native
American Church, is protected under the foregoing constitutional provisions Defendants
argued that the racially exclusive interpretation of the federal exception contained in 21
C.F.R. 1307.31 advocated by the State, would have the effect of "imposing a racial
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exclusion to membership in the Native American Church itself. To exclude individuals of
a particular race from being members of a recognized religious faith is offensive to the
very heart of the First Amendment." See, Boyll v. United States, supra, at 1340.
Defendants also moved to dismiss the criminal charges against them on the
ground that the State's prosecution of Defendants for providing peyote to non-Indian
members of the Oklevueha Native American Church in Native American religious
ceremonies, is protected under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
to the United States Constitution. The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution provides in Section 1 that:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
where they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States;
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. Amend XIV. In Boyll, supra, the court observed that "any attempt to
restrict religious liberties along racial lines would not only be a contemptuous affront to
the First Amendment guarantee of freedom of religion but also to the Fourteenth
Amendment right to equal justice under the law." Id.
Defendants also moved to dismiss the charges against them on the grounds that
they had no intent to violate the Utah Controlled Substances Act, and believed at all times
that they had a federally protected constitutional right to use and provide peyote to
members of the Oklevueha Native American Church in Church ceremonies based upon
the federal peyote exemption discussed in United States v. Boyll, supra. See, Affidavit of
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James Warren Flaming Eagle Mooney, paras. 15-17, Addendum E, Exhibit 1; Affidavit
of Linda Mooney, paras. 15-17, Addendum E, Exhibit 2.
In Boyll, a New Mexico federal district court held that the federal peyote
exemption applies to both Indian and non-Indian Native American Church members, and
dismissed the prosecution of a non-Indian member of a Native American Church for use
of peyote in Native American Church ceremonies, as a violation of the First and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. In Boyll, the court also found
that the very existence of the federal exemption negates the argument that the
government has any "compelling interest" in regulating the use of peyote for religious
purposes by Native American Church members. See also, Church of the Lukumi Babalu
Aye, Inc. v. City of HialeaK 508 U.S. 520, 113 S.Ct 2217, 2234, 124 L.Ed.2d. 471 (an
interest served by a statute is not compelling where the statutory framework permits
derogation of that interest.)
Defendants further moved the court to dismiss the criminal charges against them
on the ground that if the federal peyote exemption incorporated in the Utah Controlled
Substances Act is held not to apply to non-Indian members of the Oklevueha Native
American Church, the plain language of the exemption does not provide proper notice of
this racial exclusion, such that the criminal prosecution of Defendants for providing
peyote to non-Indian members of the Oklevueha Native American Church violates the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, in
that Defendants did not have reasonable notice that such conduct was unlawful.
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Following briefing and hearing on the Defendants' Motion To Dismiss, the district
court entered a Ruling On Defendant's (Sic) Motion To Dismiss, dated September 15,
2001, denying the motion on all grounds. See, Ruling, Addendum A.
QUESTIONS OF LAW
1.

Are the Defendants exempt from criminal prosecution for racketeering and

distribution of peyote under the federal exemption for use of peyote in bona fidt religious
ceremonies by members of a Native American Church incorporated in the Utah
Controlled Substances Act?
2.

Does the State's criminal prosecution of Defendants for racketeering and

distributing peyote to members of the Oklevueha Native American Church for bona fide
religious purposes in Church ceremonies, violate Defendants1 right to the free exercise of
their fundamental religious beliefs and their right to be free from any establishment of
religion by the State under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and
Article 1, Sections 1 and 4 of the Utah Constitution?
3.

Does the State's criminal prosecution of Defendants for providing peyote

to non-Indian members of the Oklevueha Native American Church for bona fide religious
purposes, violate Defendants1 right to equal protection of the law under Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 24 of the Utah
Constitution.
4.

If the federal peyote exemption for use of peyote by Native American

Church members incorporated in the Utah Controlled Substances Act, is held not to apply
to non-Indian members of the Oklevueha Native American Church, does the criminal
prosecution of Defendants for racketeering and distribution of peyote to non-Indian
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members of the Defendant Native American Church for bona fide religious purposes,
violate Defendants' right to due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution and Article I, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution, where the
plain language of the exemption did not afford Defendants reasonable notice that
distribution of peyote to non-Indian members of the Oklevueha Native American Church
would violate the exemption and subject the Defendants to criminal prosecution under the
Utah Controlled Substances Act?
Standard of Review: The district court's rulings on issues of law are reviewed
for correctness, granting no deference to the lower court's decision. Bradford v. Bradford,
1999 UT App 373, 1J10,993 P.2d 887 (citations omitted), cert, denied, Bradford v.
Demita, 4 P.3d 1289 (Utah 2000).
ISSUES RAISED IN THE DISTRICT COURT
Each of the foregoing issues was preserved in the Defendants' Motion To Dismiss
and supporting memoranda and oral argument in the district court, true and correct copies
of which are attached hereto as Addenda C-E.
NECESSITY FOR IMMEDIATE APPEAL
A.

The Legal Issues On Which This Case Turns Involve Interpretation
Of The State Constitution And Statutes Which Are Matters Of
First Impression And Will Be Decided By This Court In Any Event
The purpose to be served in granting an interlocutory appeal is to get directly at

and dispose of the issues as quickly as possible, consistent with thoroughness and
efficiency in the administration of justice. Manwill v. Oyler, 11 Utah 2d 433, 361 P.2d
177 (1961). In this case, the disposition of the pending criminal charges against the
Defendants turns not on factual issues, but on issues of law involving the interpretation of
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Utah constitutional and statutory provisions which are matters of first impression that will
ultimately be determined by this Court. Thus, by deciding these issues in the proposed
appeal, this case and other pending cases presenting the same issues can be expeditiously
adjudicated by the lower courts.
B.

Determination Of Pivotal Legal Issues Now Will Result In Judicial
Economy By Avoiding Inconsistent Verdicts And Judgments
And Multiple Appeals In Pending Cases And Avoid Further
Unfounded Prosecutions
In addition to the prosecution of the Defendants in this case in Utah County, other

Native American Church members are being prosecuted in other cases in Utah County
and in Weber County for providing peyote to members of Native American Church
members in Church religious ceremonies. See, e.g., State of Utah v. Nicholas Stark, Case
No. 001903155, Second District, Weber County, State of Utah, and State of Utah v.
David Hamblin, Case No. 001402733, Utah County, State of Utah. Thus, this Court
should resolve the pivotal legal issues common to all of these cases, in order to avoid a
waste of judicial resources in the trials of at least three actions, and to avoid the
inconsistent verdicts or judgments these cases may produce, as well as multiple appeals
to this Court. Moreover, by issuing a definitive ruling on the legal issues presented by
the proposed interlocutory appeal at this juncture, the Court will likely prevent the
unfounded prosecution of other members of Native American Churches throughout the
State of Utah.
C

Determination Of The Legal Issues Will Likely Result In The Dismissal
Of All Pending Criminal Prosecutions Against Native American Church
Members
In the event this Court rules that the Defendants rights to provide peyote to

members of the Oklevueha Native American Church for bona fide religious purposes in
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Church ceremonies is protected under the Constitution and Laws of the State of Utah and
the United States, it is highly likely that the criminal prosecutions against all Native
American Church members, including the Defendants in this case, will be dismissed,
thereby conserving judicial resources and sparing Church members from the continuing
threat of criminal prosecution for exercising their fundamental beliefs and practices as
members of the Native American Church.
D.

The Court Should Immediately Adjudicate The Legal Issues To Protect
All Members Of The Native American Church In The State Of Utah
From The Chilling Effect Of Threatened Criminal Prosecution On
The Free Exercise Of Their Fundamental Beliefs
Prior to the pending criminal prosecution, the Defendant Oklevueha Earth Walks

Native American Church of Utah, located in Benjamin, Utah, had 200-300 participating
members. Following the institution of criminal charges against the Defendant Church
andits spiritual leaders, the Defendants James and Linda Mooney, and the seizure of the
Church's sacred pipes, peyote, office equipment, membership lists and donation records
by Utah County officials in October of 2000, members of the Defendant Church have
been placed under intensive surveillance, interrogated regarding their religious beliefs
and practices and threatened with criminal prosecution for participating in Church
ceremonies which involve the worship of peyote as a sacrament and deity.
As the result of the foregoing, members of the defendant Oklevueha Native
American Church have been afraid to come to the Defendant Church in Benjamin, Utah,
to associate for religious worship or to make financial contributions for fear of criminal
prosecution by the State of Utah and the Defendant Church has been driven to brink of
extinction. Thus, while the criminal prosecutions of Oklevueha Native American Church
members wind their way through the "justice" system, a whole community of Native
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American Church members within our State is being effectively chilled in the exercise of
their fundamental religious beliefs and practices by the threat of criminal prosecution.
Thus, it is imperative that the Court definitively answer the questions posed by the
proposed appeal at the earliest possible time, so that Native American Church members
within the State of Utah will have clear guidelines to enable them practice their religion
within the bounds of law and without further government interference.
ADVANCE TERMINATION OF LITIGATION
The resolution of this case turns on a determination of the rights of the
Defendants, a Native American Church and its spiritual leaders, to practice their
fundamental religious beliefs, including the worship of peyote as a sacrament and
deity,under the state and federal Constitutions and Laws. If, as Defendants assert, the
district court has erred in its rulings on these issues, Defendants will be discharged and a
lengthy trial on the multiple felony counts against Defendants will be averted. Thus, an
interlocutory appeal will materially advance the termination of this litigation and should
be granted.
THE UTAH SUPREME COURT SHOULD RETAIN THIS CASE
This case involves important issues of law affecting the substantial rights of
Native American Churches and their members to freely exercise their fundamental
religious beliefs and practices under the Constitution and Laws of the State of Utah, as
well as the interplay of state law and federal laws concerning these matters.
These issues of law are largely matters of first impression which should properly
be definitively addressed by the State's highest court because of their importance in the
administration of justice to members of minority religious groups within a state that has a
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fairly dominant religion, so that the lower courts, law enforcement officials, Native
American Churches and their members, and those advocating on their behalf, have clear
legal guidelines concerning the rights of Native American Churches and their members to
use peyote in connection with Native American religious ceremonies without the fear of
criminal prosecution and undue government interference.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 3rd day of October, 2001.

'KATHRgXCOLD
Attorney and Co-Counsel foFDeffcncIants
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 3rd day of October, 2001, I delivered a true
and correct copy of the above and foregoing Petition For Permission To Appeal An
Interlocutory Order, to Mr. David Wayment, Assistant Utah County Attorney, Attorney
for Plaintiff, at 100 East Center Street, Suite 2100, Provo, Utah, 85606, via United States
Mail, postage prepaid.

lTHRY|fCOLLARD
Attorney And Co-Counsel
for Defendants
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BY:

M A R K L.

SHURTLEFF

ATTORNEY GENERAL
RAY HINTZE
Chiei Uectty - Oml

KIRK TORGENSEN
Chief Deputy - Criminal

October 26,2001
Pal Barthlomew
Court Clerk
Utah Supreme Court
450 South State #500
PO box 140210.
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0230
RE: State v. Oklevaeha, Supreme Court Case No. 20010787-SC
State's Response to Petition for Interlocutory Appeal
Dear Ms. Barthlomew:
This letter is to inform the Court that the State does not oppose granting the abovecited petition for interlocutory appeal on the question of whether provisions of the U.S. and
Utah Constitutions, as well as state and federal statutes, prohibit the prosecution of nonIndian members of the Native American Church on charges of drug possession and
distribution. The facts regarding the charges are largely undisputed, and resolution of the
issue would materially affect whether the petitioners have a viable defense to the prosecution.
The State therefore does not oppose the petition with respect to the legal and
constitutional questions as stated above.
Sincerely,
Brett J. DelPorto
Assistant Attorney General
Section Chief, Criminal Appeals Division
cc: Kathryn P. Collard, counsel for petitioner
David H.T. Wayment, Deputy Utah County Attorney

